By : - Woldu Ghebresellasie
In its latest move against Eritrea, Horn Review has published a bewildering article based on an interview with a self-proclaimed “former high-ranking member of the Ethiopian Navy.” The piece merely recycles old historical distortions about Ethiopia’s claim to sovereign sea access. The officer dwells on what the host himself describes as a “historical, professional, and emotionally charged reflection on reclaiming the Port of Assab.”
The officer’s first unfounded claim laments that Massawa was “effectively granted to Eritrea, while Assab was envisioned as an access point for the Tigrayan faction, TPLF.” He further alleges that an agreement between the EPLF and the TPLF allowed Tigray to secede and seize Assab, while the EPLF would take Massawa and pursue independence. The officer even attributes the defeat of the Ethiopian Navy—mischaracterized by him as a “political choice and withdrawal”—to this alleged “agreement.”
Instead of acknowledging the Navy’s humiliating defeat at the hands of the gallant EPLF fighters, the officer makes a futile attempt to conceal its collapse in 1991. During the decisive battle to liberate Massawa (Operation Fenqil), more than 40,000 Ethiopian soldiers were killed, captured, or wounded; 80 tanks were seized, 30 destroyed, and the Ethiopian naval force was annihilated.
The second false claim argues that Ethiopia alone invested heavily in Assab—an argument often used to justify its supposed ownership. This reasoning is shallow and ahistorical. European colonial powers also invested heavily in Africa to extract resources, yet no one suggests that modern European states can now reclaim their former colonies. Far from reclaiming former colonies, they are instead obliged to pay reparations and issue apologies for gross human rights violations and for the billions looted in precious resources.
The third outrageous lie the officer peddles is that the “historical allegiance” of Assab and its surroundings “lay outside the current Eritrean boundary.” This betrays a shallow understanding of the region’s history. The territorial integrity of modern African nations is based on the sanctity of colonial borders, as enshrined in the charters of both the United Nations and the African Union—not on supposed “allegiances” or “belongingness.” The claim also distorts the demographic reality of the Afar people, who inhabit areas across Djibouti, Eritrea, and Ethiopia—just as the Tigrigna, Saho, and Kunama ethnic groups live in both Eritrea and Ethiopia. Other major transboundary ethnic groups in Africa include the Issa in Djibouti and Somalia; the Somalis in the Ogaden (Ethiopia), Somalia, and Kenya; the Oromos in Kenya and Ethiopia; the Nuer in South Sudan and Ethiopia; and the Hutu and Tutsi in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, and Tanzania. To allege that the Eritrean Afar have stronger allegiance to Ethiopia is tantamount to acknowledging that the Ethiopian Somalis, the Ethiopian Oromos, and the Ethiopian Nuer feel the same towards Somalia, Kenya, and South Sudan, respectively.
Fourth, citing the 11TH September, 1952 United Nations resolution that established the federation between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the officer claims that Assab was “legally recognized as falling under Ethiopia’s federal jurisdiction and that maritime access was an internationally affirmed right.” In reality, no article in the federal arrangement singles out Assab as such. This misconception exposes the officer’s historical blindness. Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia as an entity with its own defined territory—precisely the same borders that constitute the modern State of Eritrea. For the record, Article 2 of the Federal Act stipulates: “The territory of Eritrea, including the islands, is that of the former Italian colony of Eritrea.”
After World War II, the United States saw Ethiopia as a strategic ally in its Cold War struggle against the Soviet Union. Ethiopia, for its part, was more interested in gaining control over Eritrea’s ports than in the financial benefits of hosting the U.S. communication base at Kagnew Station, which facilitated communications with U.S. forces in Korea and monitored Soviet activities. The U.S. tacit endorsement of Ethiopia’s annexation of Eritrea—motivated by strategic interests in the Red Sea Basin—is best illustrated by the infamous 1952 statement of then–Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.
“From the point of view of strict justice, the opinion of the Eritrean people must receive consideration. Nevertheless, the strategic interests of the United States in the Red Sea Basin and world peace make it necessary that the country be linked with our ally, Ethiopia.”
Fifth, the officer falsely asserts that “during Eritrea’s final secession, Assab was not fully secured or part of the territory claimed by the emerging Eritrean state.” Contrary to the officer’s tenuous argument, not only did the EPLF liberate the entirety of Eritrea on 24 May 1991—including Assab, which was liberated one day after the fall of Asmara—but its commando and mechanized units also fought alongside the TPLF-led EPRDF forces all the way to Addis Ababa, toppling the Derg regime on 28 May 1991.
Moreover, the officer’s argument that Ethiopia’s security vulnerability stems from its lack of a naval base or access to Assab is both shortsighted and misleading. It is a diversion from Ethiopia’s real problems—economic stagnation, political crisis, and persistent ethnic strife.
Finally, the former naval officer shamelessly suggests that “Ras Dumera, currently a conflict zone between Eritrea and Djibouti, could serve as a potential site for an Ethiopian naval base due to its strategic location.” This is factually incorrect. Ras Dumera is not a contested territory, and Ethiopia has absolutely no claim or relevance to sovereign Eritrean land.
As for “offering Eritrea tangible economic benefits in exchange for joint management or Ethiopian sovereign access—such as electricity, fertile land, airline services, and telecom”—Eritrea will not compromise its sovereignty for any such bargain. It is worth noting that peaceful coexistence and regional economic cooperation have always been at the core of Eritrea’s national policy.
Final Note
The adage that “necessity knows no law,” which seems to obsess many Ethiopian elites, is inapplicable when it comes to immutable international norms. This inveterate obsession with sea access—driven by emotion, frustration, and political failure—cannot override the sanctity of colonial boundaries or justify any attempt to redraw them.
Republished from Red Sea Beacon: https://redseabeacon.com/ethiopias-assab-port-obsession-beyond-the-realm-of-rationality/